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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of: 
PITTS, Erika R. and 
PITTS, Vallarey L., 
Persons under 18 years 
of age. 
Case Nos. 241839 and 
241841 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT-MOTHER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Whether the State of Utah exercised diligent 
inquiry when attempting to serve appellant personal 
and whether the State of Utah determined appellant 
was outside of Utah before obtaining service by 
publication in an action to permanently deprive 
appellant-mother of her children as required by 
§55-10-88(4)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amend 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent petitioned the Second District Juve 
ile Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
permanently deprive appellant of her above-named 
children. 
In sworn testimony Victor Irl Carlson, an 
employee of the Utah Department of Family Services, 
testified that on behalf of the State of Utah the 
only inquiry he made to locate appellant was to: 
1) check with the Post Office; 2) check with the 
Baywood Hotel; 3) check with Utah Power and Light 
Company. After making the above inquiry Mr. Carlsoi 
testified that he then filed an affidavit to obtain 
service by publication. (See page 17, line 29 -
page 18, line 8 from the transcript of the October 
17, 1974 hearing held in the Second District Juveni 
Court.) Darrell Meyers, also an employee of the Ut 
Department of Family Services, testified that he in 
addition asked Hattie Pitts one time if she knew 
appellant's address and looked through the Gandys 
listed in the telephone book. (See page 18, line 2 
page 19, line 6 of the October 17, 1974 Juvenile 
Court hearing transcript.) Appellant was served by 
a notice printed for four (4) consecutive weeks in 
-2-
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The Salt Lake Times. Appellant was not personally 
served. 
On July 16, 1974, the Second District Juvenile 
Court entered its Order permanently depriving appel 
lant of her children. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 18, 1974, appellant appeared for 
the first time seeking to set aside the July 16, 
1974 Order of termination•because she was not persoi 
ally served with Summons as required by Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that appellan 
had not appeared in the action. On October 17, 197 
appellant's motion to set aside was heard and denie< 
by the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, Judge of the 
Second District Juvenile Court. Appellant hereby 
appeals Judge Whitmer's October 17, 1974 denial of 
her motion to set aside the July 16, 1974 Order ter 
minating appellant's parental rights because of im-
proper service. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS BY JUDICIAL Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, U. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ORDER IS: A) A DRASTIC ACTION; B) AN ACTION IN 
PERSONAM. 
This Court said in State in Interest of Bennett 
77 Utah 247, 254, 293 P. 963, 966: 
It has always been the policy of both 
the Legislature and the courts of the 
various states not to deprive or inter-
fere with the important and sacred re-
lation of parent and child unless abso-
lutely necessary for the welfare of the 
child or for the protection of society. 
And more recently in the Case State v. Lance, 23 lite 
2d 407; 464 P.2d 395, 397 (1970): 
Deprivation of the parents1 custody of 
their children is a drastic remedy which 
should be resorted to only in extreme 
cases and when it is manifest that the 
home itself cannot or will not correct 
the evils which exist. The cutting of 
family ties is a step of utmost gravity 
and is undesirable both socially and 
economically and should be avoided un-
less that is the only alternative to 
. be found consistent with the best inter-
est of the children. There is a presump-
tion that it is generally for the best 
interest and welfare of children to be 
reared under the care of their natural 
parents. 
Also see §55-10-100(18) U.C.A. (1953, as amended 196 
State in Interest of F. V. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 
2d 948 (1962). 
Besides this Court's unequivocal statement, our Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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regarded and vigorously protected by the law. 
Common law jurisdiction is colored with the ter 
"in personam" and "in rem". Black's Law Dictionary 
899 (4th ed. 1968) states: 
In the Roman Law, from which they are 
taken, the expressions "in rem" and "in 
personam" were always opposed to one 
another, an act or proceeding in personam 
being one done or directed against or 
with reference to a specific person, 
while an act or proceeding in rem was 
one done or directed with reference 
to no specific person, and consequently 
against or with reference to all whom 
it might concern, or "all the world". 
Also see Freeman v. Alderson 119 U.S.185, 7 S.Ct. 16 
30 L.Ed. 372. 
In the instant case the Legislature has provide 
for service of process to obtain jurisdiction withoi 
reference to the ancient concepts of "in rem" or "ir 
personam". To understand the importance of the insl 
case it is helpful to realize that we are dealing wi 
a personal relationship not created by the State. 
Therefore, this is an action in personam which tradi 
tionally requires personal service instead of a pro-
ceeding in rem where the mere presence of the thing 
within a Court's jurisdiction empowers the Court. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
FOR A DRASTIC IN PERSONAM ACTION THE CONSTITUT! 
OF THE UNITED STATES AS DOES THE CONSTITUTION AND II 
OF UTAH REQUIRE A DILIGENT EFFORT TO PERSONALLY SER^ 
THE PARTY AFFECTED. 
Due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Foui 
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States and by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitut* 
of the State of Utah is violated by the mere act of 
exercising judicial power upon process not reasonab 
calculated to apprise the defendant of the pendancy 
of an action. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v 
Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 35 S.Ct. 579, 59 L.Ed. 910. 
And the violation is not cured by granting the aggr 
party a hearing on its motion to set aside the tain 
judgment. The burden of affording proper notice re 
on the plaintiff. It cannot be avoided by the per-
functory judicial approval of an unsupported conclu 
sion of due diligence. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S 
545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62. 
Since 1864 it has been recognized that "Partie 
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be 
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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they must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 
U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864). Also 
see Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 
779, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914). The landmark case of 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.J 
306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), 
required "notice reasonably calculated, under all t\ 
circumstances to apprise interested parties of the 
pendancy of the action and afford them an opportune 
to present their objections." Thus, "at a minimum" 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
demands that a deprivation of life, liberty or prop* 
be preceded by "notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case." Mul1ane, a-
313, 70 S.Ct. at 657. Moreover, this opportunity 
"must be granted at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner." Armstrong v. Manzol , 380 U.S. 545, 
552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). 
Synthesizing decisions "representing over a 
hundred years of effort," the United States Supreme 
Court recently refined these fundamental requiremen" 
of procedural due process into the following standai 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, 
absent a countervailing state interest 
of overriding significance, persons 
forced to settle their claims of right 
and duty through the judicial process 
must be given a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard. Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780, 785, 
28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). 
From reading the opinions rendered by the Unite 
States Supreme Court it is obvious that they allow 
flexibility in the manner in which the process is 
served upon a party to a lawsuit. But, this flexi-
bility means that MA procedural rule that may satis-
due process in one context may not necessarily sati: 
fy procedural due process in eyery case." Bel 1 v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540, 91 S.Ct. 586, 1590, 29 L 
2d 90 (1971). The procedural safeguards afforded ii 
each situation should be tailored to the specific 
function to be served by them. See Goldberg v. Kel 
397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1! 
In determining the specific procedure required by di 
process under given set of circumstances we must co 
s i d e r : 
The precise nature of the interest that 
has been adversely affected, the manner 
in which this was done, the reasons for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter La  Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
doing it, the available alternatives 
to the procedure that was followed, 
the protection implicit in the office 
of the functionary whose conduct is 
challenged, [and] the balance of hurt 
complained of and good accomplished . 
• • • Joint Anti-Facist Refugee 
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 
163, 71 S.Ct. 624, 644, 95 L.Ed. 817 
(1951). (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) 
As stated in Point I of appellant's brief, th 
interest adversely affected is one which the law a 
all men consider to be of utmost importance. Ther 
fore, basic fairness as demonstrated in the above 
cited authorities under the rubric of due process 
requires that respondent conduct an exhaustive inc 
to locate appellant before jurisdiction may be obt 
over her by publication. The U.S. Supreme Court 
correctly noted in Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 
112, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 78 at 116: 
It is common knowledge that mere newspapei 
publication rarely informs the landowner 
of proceedings against his property. 
And at 117: 
At too many instances notice by publi-
cation is no notice at all. 
The specific Utah law which requires a diligi 
effort to personally serve the affected party is Digi ized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Section 55-10-88(4)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended) which states that: 
if the address or whereabouts of the 
parents or guardian outside the state 
cannot after diligent inquiry be as-
certained, by publishing a summons 
in a newspaper having general circu-
lation in the county in which the 
proceeding is pending (Emphasis 
added. ) 
The statutory command coincides with the constitu-
tional principles of jurisdiction in that responde 
is clearly required to conduct a "diligent inquiry 
and cannot get by with anything less, 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT FELL FAR SHORT OF HIS LEGAL DUTY T 
CONDUCT A DILIGENT INQUIRY TO PERSONALLY SERVE 
APPELLANT. 
Assuming that the respondent made the five 
inquiries asserted, checking at the post office an 
the power company were the only efforts which coul 
be considered primary sources to garner informatic 
as to appellant's whereabouts. Unfortunately thes 
sources were only partially exhausted for there via 
no effort to use them to contact appellant's rela-
tives living in Salt Lake who, according to appell 
affidavit, knew her address. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Checking at the Baywood Hotel is admirable but 
could hardly be considered a primary source for 
finding appellant since the only testimony was that 
appellant left her child there. There is not testi-
mony that she ever lived there, that she ever receiv 
mail there, etc. 
The mother of appellant's boyfriend's, Hattie 
Pitts', ignorance of appellant's whereabouts was onl 
hearsay evidence which is countered by appellant's 
affidavit that appellant was staying at Hattie Pitts 
family home in which Hattie Pitts lived for a number 
of years. 
Mr. Meyers' looking through the phone book hard 
deserves comment since there is no testimony that 
he called any of the Gandys listed. Obviously a 
telephone could be listed under an initial or first 
name which was unfamiliar to Mr. Meyers. All of the 
Gandys listed could yery well be relatives who knew 
appellant's address for he was not dealing with a 
common surname such as Smith or Jones. Unfortunatel 
no phone calls were made. 
Since publication in the Salt Lake Times has Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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little chance of notifying anyone, in effect, appe 
lant's parental rights were terminated by a teleph 
call to the post office and the power company, bol 
stered by a perusal of the phone book, a questiona 
conversation with a friend's mother, and a check a 
a hotel where appellant was seen. This inquiry cc 
have been accomplished in fifteen (15) minutes. 
There was absolutely no effort to contact app 
lant's mother or siblings who live in Salt Lake, 
attend Salt Lake schools, have been on Salt Lake 
welfare rolls, etc. Logically, relatives would be 
the primary source of locating a person. 
The Utah Department of Family Services had th 
children and obviously from the petition knew thei 
names. Therefore, a call to the Department of Vit 
Statistics could turn up birth certificates which 
would give addresses and names. This research C O L 
easily extend back another generation to find more 
names and addresses. From the birth certificates 
the hospital where the children were born could be 
ascertained. From the hospital records may be foi 
a doctor who may have a continuing relationship wi Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the family. Though this information may have been 
a few years old at least some information would ha 
been discovered. 
Respondent's cursory efforts did not extend t 
such primary sources as tax rolls, automobile regi 
trations, driver's license rolls, judicial records 
city records, etc., etc., etc. This partial list 
available primary sources of information to locate 
parents is designed to demonstrate how shallow anc 
perfunctory the Utah Department of Family Services 
inquiry was. Appellant lived in Salt Lake City ft 
almost two (2) decades yet respondent was unable i 
find one relative or one address. Their results 
speak for themselves. The State of Utah did not 
conduct a diligent inquiry. 
POINT IV 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH PROCEEDED WITH SERV! 
BY PUBLICATION THEY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER APPELLAN" 
WAS OUTSIDE THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Section 55-10-88(4)(b) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) states that: 
if the address or whereabouts of the 
parents or guardian outside the State 
cannot after diligent inquiry be ascer-
tained, by publishing a summons in a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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newspaper having general circulation in 
the county in which the proceeding is 
pending. (Emphasis added.) 
The statute is clear that the parent must be o 
side of the State. The case law is adament that th 
must be strict compliance with the statutory comman 
for a prior determination that the party to be serv 
is out of state. See Arnow v. Bishop, 120 P.2d 423 
112 Mont. 611; Evans v. Hallas, 167 P.2d 94, 64 Ari 
142; Crummer v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court In and 
Elko County, 238 P.2d 1125, 68 Nev. 527; and Sine v 
Stout, 203 P.2d 495, 119 Colo. 254. There was no 
evidence that the State knew appellant was outside 
the State of Utah when service by publication was 
sought in direct contravention of statutory command 
CONCLUSION 
The drastic in personam action terminating par 
rights according to United States Constitutional an 
Utah Law requires a diligent inquiry to personally 
serve the parent to be deprived which diligent inqu 
was not met in the instant case. 
To secure jurisdiction over unknown parties 
by constructive service through publication 
is a concession of the law to the hard cir-
Digitized b  the Howard W. Hun er Law Library, J. Reub n Clark Law School, BYU. 
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steps. The phrases "due inquiry" and 
"diligent inquiry" in that statute are 
not intended as useless phrases, but 
are put there for a purpose. Those 
two phrases have a wel1-understood 
meaning that cannot be reconciled with 
the taking of a chance or guessing 
that the names and addresses of un-
known parties cannot be ascertained. 
A perfunctory inquiry does not comply 
with the provisions of the statute. 
An honest and well-directed effort 
must be made to ascertain the names 
and addresses of unknown parties. 
The inquiry must be as full as the 
circumstances of the particular situ-
ation will permit. Graham v. 0 ' Connor , 
182 N.E. 764, 766, 350 111. 36. 
Furthermore respondent failed to meet the spec 
requirements of Section 55-10-88(4)(b) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) in ascertaining that appellant was 
outside the State of Utah before proceeding with se 
vice by publication. 
Service was improperly made upon appellant. 
Appellant hereby requeststhis Court to reverse Judgi 
Whitmer's October 17, 1974 decision denying appellai 
motion to set aside the July 16, 1974 order permanei 
depriving her of her children. 
Respectfully subm^tte< 
Gordon F. Espli n 
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